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THE RESPONSIVE ANSWER IN EQUITY CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE FOR THE
DEFENDANT.
The rule which is the subject 6f this paper may be stated
as follows:

The answer of the defendent, under oath, when responsive to the bill, is conclusive, unless contradicted by two witnesses, or by one witness and such corroborating facts and
circumstances as are equal to the testimony of another
witness.
It is here proposed to examine the origin, history, and
theory of this rule, and to maintain that in view of the
changes in the law of evidence it should be abandoned.
In a recent case in Pennsylvania a legatee under a will
filed a bill against the executrix of the will, whose account
had been adjudicated by the Orphans' Court during the
minority of the plaintiff, charging the fraudulent appropriation by the executrix of certain specified property belonging
to the decedent, and the fraudulent omission to include it in
S37
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the account, and claiming that the facts became known to the
plaintiff only a short time before filing the bill. The
respondent in her answer directly and explicitly denied the
a;.erments of fraud in the bill, and claimed ownership of the
property in herself. It was held that the plaintiff must meet
the responsive answer and overcome it with two witnesses, or
with one witness and corroborating circumstances, and, there
being no such evidence, a det-ree dismissing the bil was
affirmed.1
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case is Crcsson v. Cresson.2 There

A typical
the widow
and administratrix of William Cresson filed a bill for an
account against Walter Cresson, the surviving partner of
William. The bill averred the partnership, and that the
capital had been derived from the proceeds of a former partnership of the two brothers. The answer denied that the
capital had been thus obtained, averred that it had been
otherwise procured, that the respondent was entitled by
agreement with his brother to a certain salary before any
division of profits, and that he had fully accounted to his
deceased partner. The surviving partner kept all the books,
and the deceased partner had been- blind. The surviving
partner was of course incompetent to testify, as was the
respondent in Huston v. Harrisons so that the case was
virtually decided by the rule in question, as established in the
earlier case of Eaton's Appeal.'
The enormous advantage which this rule confers upon
the respondent is well known to all practitioners, and doubtless nearly every practising lawyer has availed himself of
its aid or been thrown out of court by his opponent's use
of it.
Needless to say, the answer is always drawn as strong as
possible, as Butler says in "Hudibras," "Does not in
Chanc'ry every man swear, What makes best for him in his
Answer?" The commentator tells the old story of the cavalier client wfio thus brushed aside his counsel's scruples, "Do
'Huston v. Harrison,x68 Pa. 136 (x89s).
2 gr

Pa.18.

' x68 Pa.x366

• 66 Pa- 483.
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you the part of a lawyer, and draw me a sufficient answer;
and let me alone to do the part of a gentleman and swear it."
The proper form of the oath in such case would be that
suggested by the comic dramatist: "Est Truthum et toturn
Truthurn et nihil nisi Truthiurn: Ita te Lawyerus adjuvet."
The two-witness rule has been followed wherever the
Court of Chancery has been established, and even in the
administration of equity through common-law forms, as
practised in Pennsylvania, it was early applied to its full extent in cases of ejectment to enforce specific performance of
a contract of sale, as appears in Eystcr v. Young, in I8o3,"
a practice confirmed by that strenuous common lawyer, Chief
Justice Gibson, in i847.
And so, under our amphibious practice, a written instrument may, in an action at law, be varied or reformed by parol
evidence of fraud or mistake, clear, precise, and indubitable
in its character, but the writing cannot be reformed by the
unsupported testimony of the party himself. There is
required the testimony of two witnesses, or one witness corroborated by circumstances equivalent to another.7
As will be seen, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, following the lead of the American cases,. has extended the rule
beyond the English precedents, as, for example, in Eaton's
Appeal,8 where Justice Sharswood, holding to the theory
that a responsive answer is evidence for the defendant,
stated the test of responsiveness to be whether the respondent
could, on cross-examination as a witness at law, be examined
as to .what he states in anticipation of his defence;9 while
in Hartley'sAppeal1 0 it is stated that the inherent improbability of the averments of the answer would be wholly insufficient, without more, to overcome its value."1
:3 Yeates, 515.
'Brawdy v. Brawdy, 7 Pa. x57. Eyster v. Young was not referred to,
but the practice was probably well settled. Spence Eq. Juris. , 7o0,
says that the Pennsylvania practice of equitable ejectment was anticipated by Fairfax, Y. B., 2z Edw. IV, 23.
T
Phillipsv. Meily, io6 Pa. 536; Thomas v. Loose, 114 Pa. 35.
866 Pa. 483. 'Cf. Kirkpatrick v. Love, Ambler, 589. -103 Pa. 2.

' This seems opposed by the authority of Gilbert on Evidence, 7th
Ed. 130, 13!, 152, which says that in such cases an issue should be
directed. Munro, Acta Cancellaria, 73 (x6o7), cites a case, decided
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As above pointed out, it makes no difference that the
respondent is incompetent to testify, as in Cresson v. Cresson 12 and Huston v. Harrison," even if his testimony had
been improperly received, as in Bell v. Farmers' Deposit
Bank," or if the defendent dies after answer filed aaid before
given an opportunity to testify or be cross-exam;ned, as in
DeRoux v. Girard.' 5
Chief Justice Mitchell, indeed, in McCullough v. Barr;$
referring to the change in the law of evidence by which
parties have been made competent witnesses and their testimony thus put on an equality, not only as to each other but
as to other evidence, continued: "If it is oath against oath,
at law the jury must decide between them; and, for myself,
I see no good reason why in equity the chancellor should not
do the same thing, keeping in mind always that the relief is
of grace and that the right to it must be clear." Yet in the
very recent case of Kane v. Insurance Co.17 the same learned
justice not only reaffirmed the rule, but applied it to the case
of the answer of a corporation supported by the oath of one
of its officers not a party to the suit.'
So rigid, indeed, and mechanical has been the application
of the rule, that in a New York case it was seriously argued
that if two defendants both deny the same fact, four witnesses are necessary to countervail their answer."
On reading such a curious perversion of legal reasoning
one is reminded of the celebrated judgment of Wouter Var
Twiller in "Knickerbocker's History of New York," who
determined an action of account by weighing the books, and,
by Sir Matthew Carew as Master in Chancery, who characterizes the
answer as a "flym flam tale so misty and cloudy that the sunshine of
truth cannot appear through it," and disregards it. Cf. Dunham v.
Gates, i Hoffman, Ch. 188; Baker v. Williamson, 4 Pa. 463.
n9x Pa. 168.
3 168 Pa. 136.
U'131 Pa. 318.
o90
Fed. Rep. 537.
M1I45 Pa. 459.
it igg Pa. 198 (igoi).
1
Langdell Eq. Pleading, § 78; Van Zile Eq. Pleading, § '9'; Van
Wyck v. Union Bank, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) i9z, contra. A corporation
having no soul to be damned can hardly answer under oath. See
elaborate note on this subject, 5 Am. and Eng. Decisions in Equity,
483. The question is at least doubtful.
"Phillips v. Thompson, x Johns., Ch. 132 (1814). Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves. Jr. 243, is referred to, but affords no countenance to the
argument.
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having found them exactly equal in size and weight, decided
that the accounts were equally balanced, that the parties

should exchange receipts, and that the constable should pay
the costs.
The history of the rule, as developed in the Court of
Chancery, is extremely obscure. The earliest case which I
have been able to find is Wakelins v. Walthal,20 in which
Lord Chancellor Nottingham, who had received the great
seal four years before, 21 alludes to the rule as though well
settled, although in Cook v. Fountain2 2 he does not seem
to have attached the same importance to an answer denying
fraud or trust.23
As no cases upon the point are contained in the Choyce
Cases (IS57-i6o6), Cary's Reports (5 Mary-2 Jac. I,
x557-i6o6), the Reports in Chancery Temp., Car. I, Car.
II, and Jac. II, nor Sheppard's Councellor (The Marrow of

the Law in English, 1651), nor any other contemporary reports, so far as I can find, it may be inferred that the rule
became recognized not much later than the middle of the
seventeenth century, and, very probably, was established
by Lord Nottingham himself, though it should not be forgotten that frequently a practice is adopted long before it
appears in the reports.
Lord Nottingham, well known as the " Father of Equity"
and the draughtsman, or, at least, one of the draughtsmen,
of the Statute of Frauds, is credited by Lord Campbell with
familiarity with the civil law. 2' He was, indeed, no slender
master of antiquities, and laid the foundation of a scientific
system of the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Court of Chancery. Upon each branch he is known to have composed a
treatise, the first entitled "A System or Collection of Rules
W2

Ch. Cas. 8, 31 Car. II, Dec. 8, 679.

1675.
X3 Swanston, Ch. S9, May 24, 1676
a It is pretty to see, as old Pepys would say, how he compares the
defendant's answer to the wager of law: "I lay no weight upon it,
that the defendant in his answer has sworn there was neither fraud,
trust, nor security in the matter, and that the defendant has in a manner waged his law upon this point and brought six witnesses along
with him who swear the same thing." The historical connection is
doubtfuL Cf Wood's New Institute, 314
"Campbell's Lives, Ch. cviiL This is also true of Lord Somers.

nDe.'cember xg,
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and Orders in Chancery," and the second "Prolegomena of
Equity."

25

In Hobbs v. Norton 28 the testimony of a single witness,
contradicting the answer, was looked upon as no evidence,
but the court seems to have taken the probability of the evidence into consideration also.
In Alam v. Jourdan, also before Lord Keeper North, 27
the rule is laid down flatly, "There being but one witness
against the defendant's answer, the plaintiff could have no
decree."
So in Bath and Montague's Case 28 it was said by Lord
Keeper Somers, "No decree can be made against a man's
answer upon the proof of one witness."
Kingdome v. Boakes 29 is to the same effect.
In more recent times the modification was introduced that
corroborating circumstances should be - taken to be equivalent to the testimony of a second witness,30 and in default of
a second witness or such corroborating circumstances the
bill was dismissed or an issue at law directed.
',In none of these early cases is there any reason given
the rule or any discussion of it. The doctrine, indeed, that
the answer of the defendant under
oath is to be taken as true,
31
unless denied, is much older.
According to Lord Bacon's Ordinances in Chancery,
promulgated in 1618, Ord. 64, "If a hearing be prayed upon
' CampbeU's Lives, Ch. xciii. Francis Hargrave in his Preface to

Hale's Jurisdiction of Parliament, London, 1796, p. 1z, says the MSS.

of these works were in his possession, having been received from Lord

Nottingham's family. Apparently they have never been printed.
Cooper Eq. P1. 226 cites MS. of Lord Nottingham.
= Vern. 136 (before Lord Keeper North, 1682), 2 Ch. Cas. 128; z
E. Cases Abr. 356, p. &
i Vern. x6i (1683), I Eq. Cases Abr. 229, pl. 12; 3 Ch. Cas. 123
S. P.
Ch. Cas. 123 (1693).
"Precedents in Chancery (Finch), case i9
a69o).
"Pember v. Mathers, i Brown, Ch. 52 (1779).
Sbepheard, Ch. 59, § 38, citing 8 Ed. IV, 4, 5; Grosvenor v. Cartwuright, 2 Ch. Cas. 2r, Mch. 3, 1679. From Practice of the High Court
of Chancery, reprint of 187o, p. 2o, it would appear to be settled practice
in 1652. In Weston v. Weston, Nov., i62o, Acta Cancellarim (Munro)
289, a bill against executors, with regard to a memorandum referred
to in the will, was decided on answer denying same before Haywarde,
Master in Chancery. See other references in the same volume to important influence of the Civil Law, p1 lO3 (I6o8), by Sir Matthew
Carew, and Stanney v. Blunte, 1566, p. 367.
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bill and answer, the answer must be admitted to be true in
all points, and a decree ought not to be made, but upon hearing the answer read in court." 32
No contemporaneous explanation of the rule is given in
the reports, but in modem times a plausible reason has been
suggested. The chancellors, it is said, who were learned
in the civil law, always exercised the right to inform their
conscience. by compelling the defendant to answer under
oath, and this extraordinary relief they could refuse to grant
except upon such conditions as they saw fit to impose. Now,
as the admissions in the answer were, of course, evidence
against him who made them, it was not unreasonable for the
chancellor to hold that if the plaintiff availed himself of this
extraordinary right, the answer under oath should be regarded as evidence in the defendant's favor as welL
According to this theory, not only does the defendant's
answer throw on the plaintiff the burden of proving his case
by two witnesses, but the responsive averments are themselves evidence, and conclusive, unless overcome by two witnesses or their equivalent. This doctrine appears to have
originated with Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story; or
has, at least, the authority of these great names in its favor.
"The plaintiff," said the chief justice,33 "calls upon the
defendant to answer an allegation he makes, and thereby
admits the answer to be evidence. If it is testimony; it is
equal to the testimony of any other witness, and, as the
plaintiff cannot prevail if the balance of proof be not in his
favor, he must have circumstances in addition to his single
witness in order to turn the balance.""
"The 7oth Ordinance is worth noting: "The defendant is not to be

examined upon interrogatories, except it be in very special cases, by
express order of the court, to sift out some fraud or practice pregnantly'
appearing to the court, or otherwise, upon offer of the plaintiff, to be
concluded by the answer of the defendant, without any liberty to disprove such answer, or to impeach him after of perjury." Bacon's
Works, vii, 287 and 288
"Clark v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153 (z81S). It was held in this
case that the rule did not apply to the answer of executors in respect
to things not within their personal knowledge "adecision.with which
io fault can be found.
"Marshall, C. J., to the same effect in.Russell v. Clark,7 Crancli, 92,
Gresfey's Equity Evidence, *4-
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Story, as circuit judge, in 1844 stated the rule with equal
force :5 "It is a perfectly well settled rule in equity that
an answer, responsive to the allegation of the bill, is positive
evidence for the defendant, and is to be taken as true, unless
disproved by the testimony of two credible witnesses, or by
one credible witness and facts entirely equivalent to, and as
corroborative as, another witness."
And these views are embodied in Story's classical work
on Equity Jurisprudence in language often quoted as the
.basis of judicial decision.$"
In Pennsylvania, as has been shown, the theory that the
answer is evidence has been adopted in its fullest extent. 71
The practical importance of the question is readily seen.
To maintain the allegations of the bill, denied in the answer
by two witnesses, is one thitig; to disprove by two witnesses
the positive averments of the answer is quite another; and,
consequently, the burden of the plaintiff will greatly differ
in the two cases. This will explain what would otherwise
seem some very refined distinctions in the early English
cases, to which Judge Sharswood refers in Eaton's Appeal,
for, in discussing the question of responsiveness, the court
assumes that whatever is responsive is evidence for the defendant.83
Now, to determine accurately the origin of the rule, and
its true scope and meaning, it will be necessary to trace its
-development from the dvii and canon laws, from which it
has been derived. It will be found that historically the answer was not evidence at all, but rather a portion of the
pleading, something corresponding to a plea in bar, and
'Gould v. Gould. 3 Story, 556.
" The answer of the defendant... is evidence in his own favor."
.. "Not only is such an answer proof in favor of the defendant, as
to the matters of fact of which the bill seeks a disclosure from him,
but it is conclusive in his favor, unless it is overcome by the satisfactory testimony of two opposing witnesses; or.of one witness corrob-

orated by other circumstances," etc., § x528. The only earlier authority

which I can find is a dictum of Lord Loughborough in 1793, in which
he speaks of an answer as "testimony." Mortimer v. Orchard, 2 Ves.
Jr.. 243.

Pusey v. Wright, 31 Pa. 387, 394; Eberly v. Groff, 21 Pa. 251;
Eatn's Appeal, 6 Pa 483.
66 Pa. 491, citing Kirkpatrick v. Love, Ambler, 589; Blount v. Burrow, 4 Bro. Ch. 75; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 7 Ves. 404.

RESPONSIVE ANSWER IN EQUITY.

545

standing under the peculiar doctrine of the Chancery, until
overcome by the requisite proof. Lord Brougham, with the
acuteness which was so characteristic of him, thus expressed
himself in the celebrated case of Attwood v. Small: 9 " The
denial is not read as evidence in the cause, and the court does
not use it as evidence; it is rather considered as a general
denial, in the nature of a plea of not guilty; a sort of general
issue, which puts the plaintiff to the proof in a particular
way, and, as it happens to be on oath, the practice is to
require that more than one oath should be on the other
side." 40
In short, while the answer containing the sworn admissions of the defendant wag evidence against him, it could not
be read as evidence in his favor at the hearing, except, for
example, where the plaintiff attempted to avail himself of
certain admissions in it, in which case he was bound to read
the whole of that portion.'1
The books, with great unanimity, ascribe the origin of
the two-witness rule to the civil law, and justly consider it
in connection with another to which much of its importance
was due. I mean the rule declaring parties to be incompetent
as witnesses on the ground of their interest. The latter doctrine was grounded on the text, " Nullus idoneus testis in re
sua intelligitur,"42 and even went much further in excluding the testimony of a near relative, father, son, or any person connected with a party,4 s as did also the canon law. 4
n6 CL and Fin. 295, 297 (1835). Lord Lyndhurst concurred. This
case, according to Campbell's Life of Lord Lyndhurst, p. 72, consumed
a longer time in the hearing than the trial of Warren Hastings.
'*Cited with approval by Woodbury, Circ. J., in Jewett v.Cunard, 3
Woodb. and M., 277, Fed. Cases, 73o.

I Blackstone, iii, 451; Brawdy v. Brawdy, 7 Pa. x59; Davis v. SPArling, x Russ. and Mylne, 64; Miller v. Gow, i Y. and C. Chan. 56;
Connop v. Hayward, x Y. and C. Chan. 33; Allfrey v. Allfrey, r McN.
and G. 87, 93; Boardman v. Jackson, 2 Ball and Beatty, 382; Ormond
v. Hutchinson, x3 Ves. 47; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns, Ch.62; Houwsll
v. George, x Madd. x3; Daniell, 5th Am. Ed., * 843; 3 Greenleaf, i6th
Ed. §§ 28r, 370. See Langdell Eq. Pleading, § 83. An exception was
also made in deciding questions of costs when the defendant's answer
was read as bearing on good faith, etc.
" Domat Civil Law, § 2044. D. xxii, S de testibus x.
" D. xxii, 5 de testibus ix. " Testis idoneus pater fiji aut filius patti
non tst." Wood's New Institute, p. 3o8
"Ayliffe's Parergon Jur. Can. Ang., 2d I., 542- Oughton Ordo
Judiciorum, Tit. xcix; Gratian Decretum (Ed. 15525, 243 E.
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Indeed, the authority of Sacred Scripture might have been
invoked for this. Was it not said, " If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true"?
In this subject, as in many others, the civil and the canon
law appear to have mutually influenced each other, and both
decidedly affected the common law. As a quaint old writer
remarked of the civil and canon law, "the common lawe
cannot otherwise be divided from these twaine then the
flower from the roote and stalke." 45
The relation of the civil and canon laws was very close,
"It was hand in hand," say Pollock and Maitland, "that
they entered England." 46
Many instances of the influence of the canon law upon our
common law might be cited, such as the distinction between
the distribution of real and personal estates of decedents,
the history of the law in connection with nude pacts, and the
law of marriage.4 7 The history of the two-witness rule will
furnish another.
The principal -texts for this are " Ubi nunserus testium
non adiicitur etiarn duo sufficient; pluralis enim elocufio
duorum numero contenta est," ' 8 and " Sanximus ut unius
testinonium nerno judicam in quacunque causa facile patiatur admitti. Et nunc manifeste sancimus ut unius omnino
testis responsio non audiatur,etiansi prxclare curie honore
prefulgeat."49 While Pothier 5 0 says "Nunquam autem
pauciores Testes quam duo fidem faciunt," though he adds
a gloss that the rule may sometimes be relaxed in unimportant cases.5
The rule was the same in the canon law, and is applied
"W. Fulbecke (Preface ii), Conference of the Civill, Canon and
Common Law of England (i6ox). Lord Bacon speaks of the civil and
canon laws as if they were identical. Works, v, x63.
"t Pollock and Maitland, 95, 96.
ax Pollock and Maitland. 1o8, 2 id. I9J5; 2 id. 369.
"D. xxii, 5 de testibus xii, Colquhoun's Summary Roman Civil Law,
§2330; Domat Civil Law, § m~. See also Walter Mantell, Treatise
on the Laws of England, 1664, 4 Somers Tracts, 6o2-31, Scotts Ed.;
Fortescue, De Laudibus, cl. xx.; Wood's New Institute, 3o2, 3o9.
Cod: Lib. 4, Tit. 2%, L 9,§ z; Pothier Pan&, 11b. 22, Tit. S,
0
Lib 22, Tit
xiv.
"Hinc colligs Wissenbachivs aliquando (leet raro) admitIti po
wuius testimonium; puta in causis pecuniariis parvi momeai
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(with unimportant exceptions) at the present day in the ecclesiastical law of England."' Thus in Evans v. Evans, in
1844,11 Sir H. Jenner Fust applied the rule to a libel indivorce, and refused to grant a decree upon proof by one
witness only; 54 and the rule is5the law of the Roman Catholic Church in-America to-day.
While it is often said that this rule originated in the
Roman or civil law, it would seem at least possible that it
had its origin in the canon law, and was adopted by the civilians. The rule of " testis unus testis ndhlls" did not exist in
the time of the "classic jurisconsults." 56
The only provision in the Roman law concerning witnesses is that relating to the formal attestation of a will,
which required seven witnesses,7 and even this provision
was disregarded by the canonists, who reduced the number

to two, as- more agreeable to the lhw of God'and the law of
nations,5 rthough, in cases of pious uses, the canon law added
the minister of the parish as a third witness, and in devises
of land it-seems a third witness was also required 5
"That happy text about two or three witnesses," say
=3 Burn's Ece. Law, 9th Ed., by Phillimore, V. 304; Gratian Decreturn (Ed: 1552), 43 E, 244 A; Ayliffe's Parergon Jur. Can. Ang., 2d
Ed., 444, 448, 541, citing a decretal of Pope Gregory IX. Ayliffe cites
as authority in criminal cases 2 Cor. xiii, x; Deut. Adx, xS. By the
canon law more credit was given to male than female witnesses.
Women were, indeed, held to be incompetent in criminal causes "by
reasont of their Modesty and the Imbecillity of their Sex and Judgment. ' Ayliffe, 537, 545, citing Cause IS, Guestion 3, Chapter 1, of the"
Decrees; Clarke's Praxis, Tit. clviii; Gibson's Codex Juris Ecc. AngL
ioTi; Wood's New Institute, p. 3o9.

:8 jurist 0. S. xo5s, S. C. i Roberts. Fee. i6.

"He assumes that the canon law is borrowed from the civil, but
Ayliffe's Parergon, which he cites, refers to the rule as common to both.
,S. B. Smith, Elements of Ece. Law, ii, § 833, 834.
'Abdy, Roman Civil Procedure, r27; Best on Evidence, § s97, note g.'
Ridley, in his View of Civile and Ecclesiasticall Law, refers it to the
Emperor Constantine, -the first Christian Emperor in the Fourth Century. Ridley, 3d Ed., x662, p. i9j.
Just. Inst., B. 2, Tit. x, § 3. At one time:five only were necesso ,,
Muirhead, Roman Law, p. 422
"Swinburne on Wills, 6th Ed., 45, citing Deut. xix.; Matt. xviiL;
Sir Thomas Ridley, View of Civile and Ecclesiastical Law, 3d Ed,
r662, p. i91; Scrutton, Influence of Roman Law, 93. According to
Gibson's Codex, 462, the*change was made in a decretal of Alexander II.

"Godolphin, Orphans' Legacy, 8, 65; Swinburne on Wills, 45, 46.
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Pollock and Maitland, "enables us to neglect the Institutes
of Justinian," 60 and, indeed, it seems to be reasonably clear
that the rule may be ultimately traced to the Mosaic law, as
contained in the Bible. All the evidence points that way, and
it is at least certain, from the frequent citations of Biblical
texts, that the civil and canon lawyers relied upon them as
furnishing authority for their doctrine.61
Thus we find, "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer
shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses; but one
witness shall not testify against any person to cause him to
die." 62
"At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall
he that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth
of one witness he shall not be put to death." 62
So in Isaiah, "And I took unto me faithful witnesses to
record, Uriah the priest, and Zechariah, son of Jeberichiah." 6,
And when Ahab coveted Naboth's vineyard, Jezebel was
c.reful to suborn two men, children of Belial, who witnessed
against him, saying, "Naboth did blaspheme God, and the
king. Then they carried him forth out of the city, and
stoned him with stones, that he died." es
In the New Testament the doctrine was fully recognized.
The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says, "He that
despised Moses' law died without mercy under two or three
6 and in other texts the rule was extended to
witnesses," e
civil as weil as criminal cases. Thus the Gospel of St. John
892 Pollock and Maitland, 335. "In ore duorum ve frium tesium
stet
omne verbum," Gibson's Codex, 462.
' See the interesting note on this subject in Best on Evidencc, It

The entire chapter on Quantity of Evidence is most valuable." See
Bentham, Judicial Evidence, v. 48o. Dryden, speaking of Nottingham
as Amri in "Absalom and Achitophel," may have been strictly accurate

when he said,
"Sincere was Amri, and not only knew,
But Israel's sanctions Into practice drew."

Numbers xxxv, 30.
' Deut. xvii, 6, repeated in Deut. xix, x5; Somer's Tracts, 3d Coil.,
i,28o; Ayliffe's Parergon, 2d Ed., 541;. Guide to English Juries, io,

io6; Wood's New Institute, 309; Mirror B. 3, Ch. 34; B. S,Ch. 1,
§ 136; Thayer, Evidence, 87; Prof. Maitland's preface to the Mirror,

7 Seld. Soc., ix, citing Renigjr v. Fogossa, Plowd. &
"Isaiah viii, 2.

z

Kings xxL, i3.

" Heb. x. 28.
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says, "It is also written in your law that the testimony of
two men is true." 67
And again, "If lie will not hear thee, then take with thee
one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses
every word may be established." e8
This is one of the few passages of the Gospels referred
to by St. Paul, who quotes it literally. 9 And again he enjoins, "Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses." 7o
At the trial of Christ before the Sanhedrim two false witnesses were found who agreed in their testimony after many
testified whose evidence was discordant. 71
In the ages of faith these texts of Scripture must have
had a mighty influence, and powerfully reinforced the authority of the rule. Other examples of this Biblical influence
may be found in the texts relating to the lex talioni,7 2 to
witchcraft, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live;" 78 the
Sabbatic legislation, the law as to tithes, marriage and divorce, slavery and usury.7 '
Turning to the common law, we find that, generally speaking, proof by a single witness was sufficient, but there are
many traces in the formative period of the common law of
the influence of the canonists, and it might even seem to
have been by accident, as it were, that the two-witness rule
was not adopted. What was technically known as trial, by
witnesses, as distinguished from trial by jury, threatened at
one time to become a serious rival of the latter, and, according to Pollock and Maitland, was due to the influence of the
canon law"5
St. John viii, x7 and xA.
'Matt. xviii, x6. Cited by Sir Walter Raleigh when on trial for
hi h treason, 2 St. Trials, is.
"z Tim. v, x9.
2 Cor. xiii, z Ayliffe, s4i, jupra.
'3Matt. xxvi, 6o; but cf. Mark xiv, 6.
Lev. xxiv, 17 et seq.; Dent.XiX, 21.
nExodus xxii, 18; Lev. xx, 27; 2 Pollock and Maitland, 551;
Howell's Letters, § 8, xxiii, A. D. x647; Trial of the Witches at Bury
St. Edmunds by Hale, C. J., i Campbell's Lives, 561.
"Psl. xv, 5; Luke vi, 35; Lev. xxv, 35; Deut. xxiii, 19; Ezek.
xviii, 8; x Pollock and Maitland, 91, 92; 2 Pollock and Maitland, 390.
'2 P. and M. 634, 636; 2 Rolle Abr. 675. Mr. Wigmore in an
article on required number of witnesses, isHary.L. P., 83, shows that
so late as the seventeenth century it was not clear that the attempt to
adopt the two-witness rule into the common law would not succeed.
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Such questions as age or nonage, dower and death, and
the ownership of a chattel, were tried by the judge upon the
oath of two witnesses.1 '
The proof of a summons in a real action was a jurisdictional fact, and the rule that two witnesses were required to
prove it is very old."
Coke on Littleton, in an often-quoted passage,7 s says that
"when a trial is by witnesses, regularly the affirmative ought
to be proved by two or three witnesses; as to prove a summons of the tenant or the challenge of a juror, and the like,"
but the learned author did not refer to the trial of -an issue
of fact before a jury, for he proceeds: "But when the trial
is by verdict of twelve men, there the judgment is not given/
upon witnesses, or other kind of evidence, but upon the verdict; and, upon such evidence as is given to the jury, they
give their verdict."
The distinction drawn by Lord Coke is clear enough, but
the idea that by the ancient common law two witnesses were
required nevertheless recurs time and again, and this passage of Coke is cited as authority. Thus, in "A Guide to
English Juries," published in 1682, and attributed to Lord
Somers, 9 the rule is extended to cases of trial before a jury,
80 expressly disapproved
but Lord Holt, in Shotter v. Friend,
of this theory, and held that at common law the single testimoniy of one credible witness was sufficient to prove any
fact.' 1
Thayer on Evidence, 18; Holdsworth, 143; 2 P. and M. 636; 3
Reeves, 296. In Anon, Y. B., 2 Ed., ii, 17 Seld. Soc., case

4, four wit-

nesses who testified to the death of the demandant's husband were contradicted by twelve. The more numerous suit prevailed.'
" 2 Reeves, 1gi; Neville v. Rokele, Y. B, z Ed., ii (1308), 17 Seld.

Soc., case & A curious coincidence may be noted in Plato, Laws,
viii, 846: "There are innumerable little matters relating to the
modes of punishment and applications for suits and summonses; and
the witnesses to summonses; for example, whether two witnesses

should be required for a summons, or how many, which cannot be
legomitted in legislation, but are beneath the wisdom of an
islator."

aW.

-

"A Guide to English Juries by a Person of Quality, p. io8 (a someCarthew, 142 (i6o).
what rare tract).
' See this case examined in a learned note, Best on Evidence, § 6x2,
and in Gibson's Codex, zoix. So in criminal cases, Styless Practical
Register, 672. Tit Witness.
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Among the grievances of the ecclasiastical courts in the
time of James I, as set forth in the so-called Articuli Cleri in
i6o5,82 the twelfth article was based on the attempt by the
common-law judges to detract from the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts on the general ground that the requirement of two witnesses was contra legem terra, and the
answer of the judges to this complaint assumes the sufficiency of a single witness at the common law.
The persistency of the belief that by the ancient common
law two witnesses were required, as in the civil law, appears
to be traceable to the apocryphal Mirror of Justice, written
probably between 1285 and x29o,3 which lays it down that
"according to the law of God two proper witnesses are
sufficient for every testimony." This was reconciled with
the trial by jury on the ground that the jurors were, in a
sense, witnesses themselves, and the greater number included
the less. 8 '
This "Enigmatical Treatise" of Andrew Horn enjoyed
at one time a high reputation, and in i55o was cited in the
Exchequer Chamber as authority for the rule of " testis unus
testis nullus." 85
Lord Coke had a high regard for it 88 and cited it frequently. Professor Maitland in his delightful criticism of
it has demolished its reputation as an authority, but the passages to which reference has been made show at least the
notions current in the author's time respecting the two-witness rule.
The origin of the rule of the common law excluding witnesses on the ground of interest is generally taken for
granted.. Bacon's Abridgement8 7 says that "it has always
been held a sacred and inviolable rule of evidence in all cases
2 St. Trials, 131, r43; 2 Inst. 6ox.
'Maitland, Introduction, 7 Seld. Soc. xxiv.
o"Mirror, B. 3, Ch. xxiv; 7 Seld. Soc. 116 (the passage is obscure);
Fortescue, De Laudibus, CIL. xxi. ' Reniger v. Fogossa, lowd. &

" Pref. 9 Co., iii; io Co., xxv and xxxv. "The Credulous Coke,"
said Prof. Maitland (Q Seld. Soc., x), "filled his Institutes with tales

frorm the Mirror."

The Mirror is also cited in A Guide to English
. Evidence B. (probably written'by Chief Baron Gilbert).

Juries, p. xo.
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whatsoever not to admit the testimony of an interested
witness."
Language could hardly be stronger, and coming from such
an authority is entitled to the greatest weight, but the only
early authorities cited Isdo not sustain the dictum, and
strange as it may appear, I can find no cases expressly recognizing the rule of exclusion until the end of the sixteenth
century, which ushered in that critical period when, as Professor Maitland says, the light of the common law was
flickering 3
Then the courts soon became busy in drawing distinctions
and laying the foundations of that elaborate body of rules
which complicated the law and impeded justice for over two
centuries, until they were abolished by modem legislation."°
The origin and development of the law of the competency
of witnesses, their exclusion on the ground of interest, and
the correlative inability to cross-examine the other party to
the suit, are very obscure. In very early times the older
forms of trial seem like attempts to extract the truth, from
those who certainly knew the facts, by means of an appeal
to supernatural safeguards. The appellant in the wager of
battle was always obliged to swear to his own personal
knowledge, visu et auditit, of the crime alleged. In early
criminal cases, during the formative period of trial by jury,
the defendant was allowed to testify on his own behalf, or,
at least, to tell his own story, and the practice continued until.
modem times to allow him to make his statement to the
1
jury. i
Torture, though little used in English law, was a mode
of determining the guilt or innocence of the party by means
of his own testimony under conditions considered likely to
extort the truth.
"Co. Lit. 6; Siderfin, 237.

17 Selden Soc., pp. xii, xxxvL

" Early cases are Gunstone v. Downes, 40 Eliz.; Benet v. Hundred
of Hertford, Mich. (6so) ; 2 Rolle Abr. 685, 686; Anon, x Bulstrode,
2o2 (1613); Oliver v. Wallington Hundred, 2 Sid. 2 (1657); Dun-

comb Trials per. Pais, 376; Rex v. Sezuel, 7 Mod. (Farresley) ixg;
cf. Wingate's Maximes (1658), p. 453.
'sE.g. i Selden Society, Pleas of the Crown, Cases i70, z84,, 192; 2

Russell on Crimes, 814; 1 Stephen Hist. Crim. Law, 44o.
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Wager of law depended on the credibility of the party's
own testimony. The compurgators made oath not of the
fact, but of their belief in his veracity.
There appears to be little evidence in the Year Books
and Abridgements, but it seems probable that these rules of
exclusion grew up as the remedy by attaint fell into disuse,
and it became necessary to guard the jury from false testimony.
The opinion has been expressed by great authority that
the common-law rules of incompetency were borrowed from
the canon law,02 and this is highly probable, as we know
that jurors were subject to the same exceptions as were witnesses in the Courts Christian,E3 and as more and more importance was given to the witness's oath, the corresponding
great and obvious danger of perjury increased, from the
penalties of which, religious or civil, parties and witnesses
should be preserved. This accords with what we know of the
history of trial by jury at common law,
It was not invented, but grew by slow evolution from the
inquest, in which the jury were at once witnesses and judges
of the fact. They were selected from the vicinage for the
very reason which would now make them incompetent,
namely, that they would be probably acquainted at first hand
with the facts in issue. No witnesses, in the modem sense,
were necessary at all, so, naturally, there could be no requirement that facts must be proved by any certain number, and,
by the same token, there was apparently no exclusion of parties or interested persons,' 4
Even so late as Lord Hale's time, who died in 1676, we
find that distingpished writer saying: 95 "For the trial is
'Best on Evidence, § 137.
"'"Excepi possunt juratores eisdcm modis quibus et testes in Curia
Christianithais juste repelluntur." Glanvil II, s2; Fleta IV, 8,"de
eXceptionbus contra juratores."
"Bohun, in his Institutio Legalis (4th Ed., 1732), 2V2, cites a case,
apparently a decision of Lord North's, in i8, where a plaintiff in
Chancery, being there dismissed by rule of court, was sworn in evidence at a trial at bar, "though much opposed by the counsel on the
other side." See the interesting case of the cook before North, C. 3.,
in North's Lives, i, 234, where the parties were examined in court,
and compare 2 Pollock and Maitland, 667-,
.Hale Hist. C L.347.
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not here simply by witnesses, but by jury. Nay, it may so
fall out, that the jury, upon their own knowledge, may know
a thing to be false that a witness swore to be true, or may
know a witness to be incompetent, or incredible, though nothing be objected against him, and may give their verdict accordingly." 96 The jury literally " found" their verdict
wherever they chose to look for it, in their own "evidence,"
or knowledge of the facts, the statements of counsel and of
parties, hearsay, rumor,
as well as the testimony of witnesses
97
in the modern sense.
Even so late as the middle of the seventeenth century it
seems to have required a judicial decision to establish that
"the allegation of the counsel at the bar is no evidence to
the jury, but the matter only which is proved upon oath upon
this allegation is good evidence." O,
The court, it was said in another place, will rather believe
the oath of the plaintiff than the oath of the defendant, if
there be oath against oath, because it is supposed that the
plaintiff hath wrong done him, and that the defendant is
the wrong-doer. 99
If, however, the witnesses were not sworn, the jury were,
and it was the jurymen's oath, with the fear of attaint for a
false verdict, which prevented the jury rendering verdicts
without sufficient evidence.1 00
Cf. Lord Bacon's Works, v. i63, and see the celebrated case of
Bushel- (Penn and Meade), Vaughan, i35; Guide to English Juries,
28, 37; Sir J. Hawle, Dialogue on Juries, temp W. III, Phila. 1798,

P. 53; Wynne's Eunomus, ii, 146-7. According to the Book of Oaths
(London, v649) the jury at nisi prius were sworn to try the suit between party and party, "according to the evidence as shall be given
you in court," but Guide to English Juries, 45 (1682), states the oath
to be "according to my evidence." See also Bennet's Case, Styles
223. In Duncombe Trials per Pais, 393, the rule of incompetency is
referred to, p. 219, 3d Ed. Vincent v. Tyrrengham, 2 Keble, 345 (20
Car. II, B. 1R.), held that the disqualifying interest might be only
equitable.
, See as to statements of parties and counsel Babington v. Venor,
5 Edw. IV, 58 (1465), and other examples cited by J. B. Thayer, S
Harv. L Rev. 316, 362; Evidence, 121, 133; Ibid., 92, iio, i.
"Styles's Practical Register, Ed. 1707, 248, citing Mich. 22 Car. I,
B. R. It is added that the allegation of the counsel is sometimes but as
they are instructed and not according to the truth of the fact. The
rules as to hearsay evidence were very lax at that time. Styles, 25.
"Styles, citing Pasch. 23 Car., B. R.
Early cases often show inconclusive verdicts rendered by the jury,
like the Scotch verdict "not proven."
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In short, the jury, in its original, was a formpl yet practical method of ascertaining the general opinion or crystallized sentiment of the neighborhood regarding facts upon
which the community ought to be well infonaied.' 16
There is certainly no doubt that perjury, during the
formative period of our law, was frightfully common, and
was treated with wonderful leniency. Fortescue, in chapter
21 of his De Laudibus, where he is contrasting the two-witness rule of the civil law with the English trial by jury, says:
"Now he may well be thought a person of an inconsiderable
interest, and of less application, who, from the gross of mankind and all his acquaintance, cannot find out two so devoid
of conscience and all faith, who, through fear, inclination,
affection, or for a bribe, will not be ready to gainsay the
truth." 102
Indeed, Pollock and Maitland say: 103 " Very ancient law
seems to be not quite certain whether it ought to punish perjury at all. Will it not be interfering with the business of
the gods? So it came to be regarded, in Bracton's time, that
perjury was a sin cognizable by the ecclesiastical courts, and,
in the conflict of jealous jurisdictions, the crime passed
unpunished, and our ancestors perjured themselves with
impunity." The perjury of a witness, consequently, was not
punishable at common law,10 4 and the first statute defining
it as a civil offence was 5 Eliz., c. 9, 1563.1°5
It resulted that by the time trial by jury assumed its
;*'Even if no evidence is given, yet, it was said, the jury should give
Ca It
a verdict for one of the parties. Vavisor, Y, B. 14 H. VII,' 2.
evidctire is' est pas donc wes p' eu.x informn' in lour coiiscienc der drf.
Et jeo pose q' nul' evidenc' fuit donc d' uts part ni de F'ptqr', no ius no
vouloient don', in' ils
donser' lour verdit'ove run ou I'autr'." Cited
by Thayer, Evidence, x33.
103Plato speaks of the prevalence of perjury in his day: "It is a
dreadful thing to know, when many law suits are going on in a state,
that almost half the people who meet one another quite unconcernedly,
at the public meals, and in other companies and relations of private
life, are perjured," Laws, xii, 948.
2 P. and M. 539.
Daines Barrington on the Statutes; De Finibus Levatis, 27 Ed. I
(x2),

p.

29...

.

( Barrington on ,, Hen. VII (1494), 343; Russell on Crimes, i.
604; 5 Reeves's Hist. 351. By 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, subornation of
perjury was punished by fine.
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modern form, and the jury found their verdict according to
the evidence of witnesses produced and sworn in court under
the supervision of the judge, and the remedy by attaint for a
false verdict had fallen into disuse, it was considered imperatively necessary to forbid parties and interested persons to
testify in their own behalf, and, in like manner, neither party
could be called for cross-examination. And this was the
state of the law when the rules of equity practice were forming. It is now necessary to consider the effect given by these
rules to the defendant's answer.
So far as I can find, neither the civil nor the canon law
ever regarded the answer of the defendant, denying the allegations of the libel, as amounting to evidence in his own
favor. The " litis contestatio" was simply equivalent to
joining issue and opening the way to proof*106
The plaintiff in the ecclesiastical court might sufficiently
prove his case from the defendant's answer, but, if he could
not, the testimony of witnesses was resorted to. The respondent does not seem to have had any right to read his own
1 07
answer.
On the contrary, the respondent was bound to make proof
of his defence, and Ayliffe instances the very cases of payment, release, or novation, etc.108
Browne, a very careful writer, goes so far as to doubt
'" Wood's New Institute, p. 318. "Tune Reus: Ego dico narrata
prout in eodem libello narranturvera non esse;" etc. Oughton Ordo
Judiciorum, Tit. lxi, et seq.; Browne's Civil Law, i, p. 464. Hunter's
Roman Law, 899, speak.s of cases where, other evidences failing, the
answer of the defendant under oath was absolutely conclusive.
"The function of the answer in the ecclesiastical law was, first, by
admissions to relieve the plaintiff ab onere probandi; .or, secondly, by
denial
to show
6_;. the plaintiff what he ought to prove. Ayliffe's Parergon
(2d Ed.),
" "When contrary facts or matters are alleg'd, 'tis tlhe duty of each
party to prove the same; and so likewise in matters relating to possession; for in such matters each party becomes both plaintiff and
defendant." Ayliffe's Parergon, 445. "The impugnant, of course, cannot read his own personal answer, but if the promovent reads part of
the answer to any one article, the impugnant has a right to read the
whole of the answer to that article:" Browne's Civil Law Practice of
Ecclesiastical Courts, i, p. 474. "Advocatus Actoris primo leget libellur Judici; deinde leget responsum Partis principalis, et si intentio
Actoris non sit plene probata ex hujusmodi responsis tune dicta Teslium legenda junt," etc. Oughton Ordo Judiciorum, Tit. cxxii.
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whether, by the civil law, any answer at all other than a
simple denial of the plaintiff's claim was required from the
defendant, the only exception being in the so-called interrogatory action framed to discover what share of an inheritance belonged to the defendant. 10 '
The treatises on equity practice, says Brownei which compare equity answers to the Roman, evidently confounded the
general issue with a personal answer, as, int
common parlance, whatever the defendant says may be called an answer
to the plaintiff.110
These conclusions are supported by the decisions of otr
Federal courts as to the effect of the answer in admiralty.
Dunlap, in his treatise on Admiralty, published in
1835 le states the practice in that court to be that the defendant's answers to the libellants interrogatories are evidence,
which must be disproved by two witnesses, or one witness
corroborated by very strong circumstances. The alithor calls
attention to the danger of the rule, which he derives from the
ecclesiastical courts.
In a subsequent passage the author says it is not settled
how far the admiralty has adopted the principle of the civil
law requiring two witnesses in cases where the common law
is satisfied with one, though Judge Peters, of Philadelphia,
in 1813, stated his inclination to adopt it 1 12 in cases where
the danger of perjury was apparent, and there is a dictum in
favor of the equity rule in the still earlier case of The Rambler, in I 7 9 4 .11s
The subject was carefully examined for the first time by
Judge Ware, of the District Court of Maine, in 1837,11 who
clearly shows that no such rule has ever been recognized ini
the admiralty, the practice in which court is derived from
the civil law, where the rule does not exist.
:"Browne's Civil Law, ii, p. 371, note 38; Story, J., id Sherwood v,
Hall, 3 Sumner, x27; Fed. Cas. x2,777.
I Browne's Civil Law, spra. Personal answers, strictly so called,
were, it seems, introduced by the canonists in the time of Gregory IX.
1 Pp. *1o, *284.
' The Betsy, 2 P. A. Browne, 349.
1 eaasdale v. The Rambler, D. C. So. Carolina, Bee 9, Fed. Cas.
13,8z5; cl. contra U. S. v. Matilda, 5 Hughes, 44, Fed. Cas. x5,741.
Hutson v. fordan, I Ware, 385, Fed. Cas. 6959.
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The rule of the civil law requiring two witnesses to prove
a fact was a general, broader rule of evidence, wholly independent of the defendant's denial in his answer, nor did the
decisory oath of the civil law sustain any analogy to it15

Judge Ware concludes that in admiralty each party is
entitled to the answer under oath of the oiher party, and that
the answer thus given is evidence for either side, but does not
require two witnesses to overcome it. This case was followed by Judge Story in the District Court of Massachusetts
shortly afterwards, 1 6 but in a later case Judge Story somewhat qualifies this by stating that the true effect of the answer is to furnish evidence for the other party, or, in a case
hanging in equilibrio, to turn the scale in favor of the
respondent."' 1
These decisions have since been followed in numerous
cases. 1 18
Now the answer to a bill in equity is twofold in its character, and combines in one instrument the admission or denial of the allegations of the plaintiff-that is, the defence
proper-and the answer to the interrogatories propounded
by the plaintiff to the defendant. These different functions
of the answer were at first clearly distinguished in the civil
and ecclesiastical procedure, where, after the litis contestatio,
the plaintiff set forth his technical "positions" in his libellus
articulatius,but, these being combined or confounded in the
chancery practice, the term answer was applied indiscriminately to the denial by the defendant of the facts upon which
the plaintiff based his claim for equitable relief, the discovery
or examination of the defendant, and again to the answer
in support of a plea, which is different from both. 19
'Citing Pothier, Obligations, n. 91o; Traite de Procedure Civile,

Part I, Ch. 3, Art. S, § 5. Cf. Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, i 67-'
contra, and Ayliffe's Parergon, 389, "of an Oath."
"Sher-ood v. Hall, 3 Sumn. 127, Fed. Cas. 12,777 (1837).
' Cushman v. Ryan, x Story, 91 Fed. Cas. 3515 (1840).

'"'Andrets v. Wall, 3 How (U. S.) 572 (1845); lay v. A1my, I
Voodb. and M. 262; Eads v. H. D. Bacon, x Newb. 2, Fed. Ca.
4232; L. B. Goldsmith, Newb. x23, Fed. Cas. 8152 (1856); The Crusader, x Ware, 437, Fed. Cas. 3456 (1837) ; The Auslralia, 3 Ware, 240,
Fed. Cas. 667 (1859).
"' Wigram on Discovery, pl. 17, 420; Hare on Discovery, 223; Storyr
Eq. Pleading, § 85o; Gilbert, Forum Rom. go; Wood, Civil Law, 313;
Langdell, Eq. Pleading, § 68.
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Wigram, in his treatise on Points on the Law of Discovery, expresses his opinion that the oath was not required
from the defendant as a witness against himself, but to
exclude the possible case of a defendant availing himself of
a defence which he may know to be unfounded in fact, and,'
to some extent, bases this view upon .he rule that an oath was
required even in case of a pure plea where there is no
discovery.120
This may be an extreme view; nevertheless, it would seem
that the practice of the Chancery in the case of pleas in
equity is not consistent with the theory that the answer of
the defendant is technical evidence. In Lord Bacon's time
i.e., "of foreign matter to
the only pleas were pure pleas,
21
discharge or stay the suit."
Anomalous pleas, supported by an answer, were at first
limited strictly to those cases where the bill (or amended
would invalidate the defendant's
bill) charged facts 1which
22
anticipated defence.
Negative pleas were long supposed to be improper, and,
strictly, they were so, but were introduced to save a defendant from a discovery in response to a plaintiff whose title
he eeied12 s

These distinctions are reasonably clear in theory, but in
practice the science of equity pleading became unendurable,
and the tendency grew stronger ad stronger to make the
pleading simpler, at least in form, 24 until, in Pennsylvania,
a defendant became entitled in all cases, by answer, to insist
upon all matters of defence in law (not being matters of
abatement, or to the character of the parties, or of matters
of form) to the merits of the bill of which he might be
entitled to avail himself by demurrer or plea in bar, 25 while
"Wigram, pL 345, 402; Heart v. Coring, 3 Paige, 566
'Bacon's Ordinances, 58, Works, vii, 285; Story, Eq. PL, § 649.
2Wigram, pl. xo7, 261; Bayley v. Adams, 6 Ves. 586; Sanders v.
King, 2 S. and S. 277. The American editor of Wigram, pl. io7, notices the importance of the answer in support of a plea in connection
with the rule under discussion. Cf. remarks of Wigram himself on
the advantage of an answer, pl. 44.
'See Wigram, pt 164, z84.
'Story, Eq. Pl. § 669.
'Equity Rule 37. In U. S. Courts, Equity Rule 39. Rule 41 as'
amended allows the complainant to waive an answer under oath, and
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the amendment of January 15, 1894, provided that "all defences in equity cases shall be made by -answer, or by
demurrer. All issues of fact must be made by answer."
In Pennsylvania the answer in equity, therefore, :as
nearly reached a point of development to which the remarks of Lord Eldon 126 would apply, that "it is neither a
plea, answer, nor demurrer, but a little of each."
In the first stage therefore of the rule, the answer being
a direct denial of the bill, the averments of the latter must
be proved by two witnesses; and in this case it is quite the
same thing to say that the answer, as evidence, must be overcome by the same measure of proof.
An important and well established modification was introduced-viz., that corroborating circumstances will take
the place of one of the two witnesses required. Apparently
this was held for the first time by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in 1739.127
Lord Hardwicke does not explain the reasons for his decision, and Lord Thurlow, who confessed he did not understand the rule itself, merely said that if there are circumstances to turn the scale, it ought to be turned. 128 It is
impossible, however, to avoid the conclusion that this exception, like the rule itself, was borrowed from the civil and
canon laws. There, proof was full or partial, plena or
semiplena. The first was proof by two witnesses, or a record, and the like; the second was proof by one witness, a
private writing, etc. But two half proofs might be combined to make full proof, and thus corroborating circumstances were allowed to take the place of the missing
12
witness. 9
deprives an answer not under oath ot its effect as evidence in favor of
the defendant unless the case is heard on bill and answer only.

'Dolder v. Huntingield; ii Ves. 293. Cf. Wigram, pl. 184.
'Walton v. Hobbs, 2 Atk. 20, followed by Janson v. Rany, 2 Atk.

i4o; Hine v. Dodd,

2

Atk. 27, and by Lord Thurlow in Pember v."

Mathers, x Bro. Ch. ;2 (1779).

Pember v. Mathers, i Bro. Ch. 5."

=4 Reeves's Hist. 79; 2 Browne, 370; Wood's Civil Law, 309;
Colquhoun's Summary, § 2327: " A well-grounded fame" was considered sufficient Ayliffe's Parergon, 444. Friar Brackley, the amusing
. minorum minimus" of the Paston Letters, contributes to that collection a curious Whitsunday sermon on "gaudium plenum" and 'semi-

plenum."
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To some extent the rule was further relaxed by its extension to cases of account where the averments of the bill are
admitted, but with a fuller statement of the surrounding
circumstances changing their legal effect so as to discharge
the defendant. The typical case is that of Kirkpatrick v.
Love,130 where the party admitting the receipt of goods in
the same sentence swore that he had paid cash for them;
and so in other cases (omitting details here unimportant) it
seems to have been agreed that if charge and discharge were
part of the same transaction, an admission of the one might
be coupled with an averment of the other.131
The English cases do not seem to have gone much further,
and Daniel 132 states the rule very cautiously as follows:
"Although a defendant cannot read his own answer as
evidence for himself, as to any other point than that of costs,
he is entitled to have benefit by his answer, so far as it
amounts to a denial of the plaintiff's case, unless the denial
by the answer is contradicted by the evidence of more than
one witness; the rule of Courts of Equity being, that where
the defendant in express terms negatives the allegationsin
the bill, and the evidence of one person only affirms what has
been so negatived,.then the court will neither make a decree,
nor send it to a trialat law." 188
In considering questions of evidence in equity it is well
to remember that it was not originally the business of the
chancellor to decide disputed questions of fact, especially
those depending on the credibility of witnesses. Such questions, if necessary, might be formulated in an issue directed
to a court of law, just as the chancellor could call on the
judges for their opinion on a question of law arising before
him. He was technically bound by the result of neither
inquiry, which was intended simply to inform his conscience.
Lord Nottingham in Duke of Norfolk's Case 134 took

MAmbler,

589.

mBlount v. Burrolo, 4 Bro. Ch. 75; Ridgeway v. Darwin, 7 Ves.
404; Thompson v. Lambe, 7 Ves. S88; Robinson v. Scolney, xg Ve.
582; Eaton's Appeal, 66 Pa. 491.
""2 Ch. Prac. 4o4.

'Thus in the early editions of Daniell. The later editions (6th
English) omit the last clause as to directing an issue. Vol. L * 843.
Contrast this with the statement of the rule by Judge Story, jup.a.
in3 Ch. Cas. i; i Pollexfen, 223.
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the opinion of the three chiefs of the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer concerning the entailment of an
equitable term of two thousand years. " When they had
done the chancellor did not show them the'respect of debating
any of their reasons in the least, but, in a formal and seemingly prepared speech, decreed the direct contrary. When
Lord North had the seal and sat there, the same cause, upon
a rehearing or review, came again to be heard before him;
and he, knowing no rule but his judgment of the law
and conscience in equity, reversed the decree." 133
Lord Eldon used to say he had " all possible respect"
for the common-law judges. He took great delight in relating how, to ascertain what estate passed to trustees, he sent
a case to the King's Bench, who told him the estate was a
fee. The Common Pleas, when asked, said the trustees took
no estate at all. Lord Eldon hcid both upinions were wrong,
13 6
and that the trustees took a chattel interest.
In short, the chancellor assumed the familiar and always
amusing r6le of the man who asks his friends for their unprejudiced advice, but, not getting the opinion that he
expects, straightway acts in accordance with his own.
So in regard to questions of fact. If the chancellor is not
satisfied with the verdict, he may direct any number of new
trials or decide at once in opposition to the verdict, as was
3
done by Lord Brougham in Armstrong v. Armstrong."
fndeed, Lord Eldon said, "The judge (in equity) must
decide, taking all the circumstances together, not absolutely
upon which side the truth lies, but that it is highly and
morally probable the truth is with one rather than the
other." 18
2

North's Lives,

2.

Campbell's
vol. vii,
M. and K.Lives,
45, x834.
The65r.
same thing has been done in Pennsylvania, Baker v. Willianmson, 4 Pa. 456. Gibson, C J., in Brawdy v.
Bra-wdy, 7 Pa. 157.
'East India Co. v. Donald, 9 Ves. *282 (1804). When the issue
was tried at law the defendant, whose answer had raised the doubt in
Chancery, could not testify at all, and naturally the jury would find
against him, to prevent which absurdity the chancellors introduced
another, viz.: the reading of the defendant's answer to the jury, of
course without cross-examination. Cf. Glynn v. Bank of England, 2
Ves. Sr. 38 (x75n), Hardwicke, L. C.
13
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The two-witness rule has left its impression upon two
other subjects in the law, the crimes of perjury and treason.
According to a well-established rule the testimony of two
witnesses, both directly contradicting the prisoner's oath, is
required to convict of perjury. "One witness," says Blackstone, 139 "is not allowed to convict of perjury, because there
is only one oath against another." By later decisions one
witness is sufficient when supported by proof of corroborating circumstances. 140
So, in actions for slander, in uttering words imputing
injury to the plaintiff, the defendant, pleading justification,
must prove the plaintiff's crime by the same quantum of
evidence. 14 1
There seems to be no authority for this practice earlier
than a charge to the jury by Chief Justice Parker, afterwards
Lord Macclesfield, in Reg. v. Muscot,142 where he, using
language quoted by Blackstone, said, "To convict a man of
perjury, a probable, a credible witness is not enough, but it
must be a strong and clear evidence, and more numerous
than the evidence given for the defendant, for else there is
only oath against oath." 143
Lord Macclesfield may have been the inventor of this rule,
but it is not impossible that he derived it from the ecclesiastical law, for perjury, though an offeitce, was, as before
stated, not a crime at common law, and was not mentioned
in any statute until 3 Hen. VII, c. i, while temporal penalties
were not imposed until 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, and 5 Eliz., c. 9.
tm
10 B.

iv, v.*35&.
Coin.
Williams, 9x Pa. 493; U. S. v. Wood, i4"Peters, 430;
Clampney's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 258 (1836); Rex v. Mayhew, 6 Car.

and P. 315; Reg. v. Parker, i Car. and M. 639; Queen v. Hook, 27
L. J. Mag. Cas. 2= (Crown cases reserved) ; article in 22 Justice of
the Peace, 542.
'Steinman v. McWilliams, 6 Pa. 177; Gorman v. Sutton, 32 Pa.
247;
Howard v. Thompson, i Am. Lead. Cas. i78 (5th Ed.).
a ro Mod. 193 (1714).
Fanshaw's Case, Skinner, 327 (1693), was an
indictment for perjury in an answer in Chancery-where the same rule
was adopted. Perhaps this special circumstance influenced the -decision. The defendant's oath required two witnesses in equity to overcome it. Why not in a prosecution -also?
2

'"Rex v. Nunez, Lee Temp., Hardw. 265 (1736); Rex v. Broughton,
Strange, 1229 (x745).
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Its punishment was undertaken by the ecclesiastical law,
where the two-witness rule doubtless was followed. 1 "
Moreover, under the Statute of Elizabeth, the Court of
Star Chamber had jurisdiction of perjury,14 5 and the proceedings there were according to Chancery practice by 1bill
and answer, with examination of the defendant on oath. 4"
Hudson in his treatise on the Star Chamber says: "They
always require indifferent witnesses, clear proof, not by relation, and double testimony or that which amounted to double
testimony; as a witness positive and accompanied with the
presumptions which supply a testimony, or where there can
be no direct testimony in works of darkness, necessary
presumption." 147
It is, therefore, highly probable that the Court of King's
Bench was influenced by the practice which was followed in
1 48
these other courts.
Whether this rule tends, on the whole, to the advancement of justice is perhaps questionable. It is criticised by
J. S. Mill in a note to Bentham's Judicial Evidence, 14'
doubted by Stephen, 15 0 and said to be dangerous by another
critic, 151 but this question must be left to the determination
of those familiar with the practical administration of the
criminal law.
The-second crime affected by the two-witness rule is that
of treason, which must be proved by the confession of the
prisoner, or proof by two credible witnesses. This has been
the law in England since I Edw. VI, c. 12,152 is traced by
'" See as to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 3 Stephens's Hist. Crim. Law,
'",4
x6 Selden Socie.y, preface, Iv, cxxxv; Hudson on
the Star Chamber, p. 51. See series of articles by J. D. Lindsay on the Star Chamber,
Green Bag, vols. 6 and 7.
'R. Crompton, L'Autorit; et Juridiction des Courts (x637), p. 29;
Lambard, Archion, x87; 16 Selden Society (Star Chamber), xxi.
.Hudson Star Chamber, 2 Hargrave, Collect. Jurid. 223 (Temp.
Car. I).

t See J. H. Wigmore, r5 Harv. L. R. 83.
'*VoL v, p. 469.
'* General View of Criminal Law, p. 294.
' Frank Safford, "Present State of the Law of "erjury" 2 Law
Mag. and Review, N. S., 912.
'Continued
or supplied by 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. I; 7 W. III,
c. 3; 36 Geo. III, c. 7; 57 Geo. III, c. 6; 11 and 12 Vict, c. 12. It
was held in Thomass Case, Dyer, 99b, that one witness of his own
knowledge, and another by hearsay from him, satisfied the requirements of the statute. See Wynne's Eunomus, i, p. 97 (4th Ed.).
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high authority to the practice of the canon law, and at least
was probably adopted by analogy as a means of providing
protection from political persecution. 15 3
Notwithstanding Bentham's ridicule of this exceptional
rule 154 the lead of these English statutes hag been followed
in the Constitution of the United States, 155 which provides
that no person shall be convicted of treason unless upon the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court; and the same provision is contained
in the Pennsylvania Criminal Code.J5
There seems to be a widespread or popular notion of the
necessity of a double witness, and we find traces of it in
unexpected quarters. Browning alludes to it in the "Flight
of the Duchess," where he describes the Duke as insistent
upon adherence to medieval custom and tradition:
"The Duke put this question, 'The Duke's part provided,
Had not the Duchess some share in the business?'
For out of the mouth of two or three witnesses,
Did he establish all fit--or unfitncses."

Browning again refers to the rule in "Asolando,"
two confirniative witnesses; three
Are surely enough to establish an act."'
'"Its origin is discussed by Best on Evidence, § 6z8, and the whole
subect ably examined by J. H. Wigrnore, i5 Hare. I- Rt.
83
"kjudicial Evidence, iii, 392; v, 48&
a rt. ILR# §31
m Act March 31, I86o, § r, P. L 385.
Asolando: Ponte dell' Angelo. (The story of
"A lawyer of note wlth law and to spare,

But also with overtmuh lust of gain.")
"When Sam Weller called to see Mrs. Bardell to get Mr. Pickwick's
'things,' 'Now what shall I do?' says Mrs. Bardell to Mrs. Cluppins.
'I think you ought to see him,' replied Mrs. Cluppins, 'but on no
account without a witness. 'I think two witnesses would be more
lawful,' said Mrs. Sanders; who, like the other friend, was bursting
with curiosity."
Dumas alludes to the rule in Monte Christo. "Albert de Morcerf:
'I am determined not to be content with anything short of an entire
retraction.' Monte Christo: 'And you intend to make him do it in
the presence of two witnesses, do you?' Albert de Morcerf: 'Yes.'"
-Monte Christo, vol. 3, ch. 26
According to the Koran, a will must be made in the presence of
two attesting witnesses of the faith, Koran, ch. v, Sale's Trans. 96;
and certain contracts for the payment of money were required to be in
writing before two witnesses, Koran, ch. ii, Sale, 34- In Turkey cire.

RESPONSIVE ANSWER IN EQUITY.

The writings of the civil and canon lawyers insist strongly
upon the danger of allowing an issue, especially a criminal
indictment, to be determined by the oath of a single witness,
who might readily be suborned or untrustworthy, while a
miscarriage of justice would not be so easily accomplished
if two witnesses are required.1 52
Of course, there is something in this argument, and. indeed, even greater safety might be secured by requiring a
still larger number, as, in fact, the canon law did, in the
case of high ecclesiastics. But, on the other hand, there is
still greater danger of a failure of justice in the very numerous cases, especially of fraud or crime, where two witnesses
cannot be had. This, at least, is the universal opinion in
modern times, though doubtless the two-witness rule in ancient times proved a valuable safeguard against perjury, for
the importance thus so frequently attached to the concurrent
testimony of two or more witnesses depends, it appears, upon
the mathematical theory of probabilities, according to which
the weight of the testimony increases in a 'Much higher ratio
than that of the arithmetical increase of the number of the
witnesses.259
Starkie in his work on evidence 1 60 recognizes this principle, and points out that, if definite degrees of probability
could be assigned to the testimony of each witness, the resulting probability in favor of their united testimony could be
mathematically ascertained, but adds, which is certainly true,
i67o, accordin3 to the vivacious biographer of Sir Dudley North,
every fact in a case must be proved by two Turkish witnesses. The
account given of the "professional" witness occasioned by this law is
very amusing, and reminds one of Bentham's suggestion of a "common witness," like a "common vouchee:" 2 North's Lives, 3781
Bentham's Judicial Evidence, v, 492. At one time the "professional
witness, it is said, advertised his calling by
means of straws sticking
out of his shoes. Bentham, iii, 168-9. " ' What! am I to understand
that these men, earn a livelihood by waiting about here to perjure
themselves before the judges of the land at the rate of half a crown
a crime?' exclaimed Mr. Pickwick, quite aghast at the disclosure."
Pickwick Papers, vol. ii, ch. xii
'See, for example, the argument in Guide to English Juries, p.
ioz; Wood's Institute, 309; Fortescue, De Laudibus, ch. xx.
Every one would admit cateris paribus that the number of witnesses testifying to a fact increases the probative force of the evi' Starkie; * 832.
dence. See Bentham, Judicial Evidence, , 63.
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that, in practice, no definite degrees of probability can be
assigned to the evidence of the various witnesses, as their
credibility usually depends upon the special circumstances of
each particular case, their connection with the parties, the
subject matter of the litigation, and many other circumstances.
Bentham, that shrewd but erratic genius, had a dim conception of a similar riature when he gravely proposed his
celebrated judicial thermometer, according to which the force
of a witness's testimony, and of the opinion of a court or
jury, should
be estimated by a numerical equivalent from zero
1
to ten.16
It will repay any one to read this section of Bentham who
has not already done so, but to examine it here would be a
waste of time. He evidently considered this one of his
finest inspirations, and said of it, "Old measures of every
kind receive additional correctness; new ones are added to
the number, the electrometer, the calorimeter, the photometer,
the eudiometer, not to mention so many others, are all of
them so many productions of this age. Has not justice its
use as well as gas?"
This is almost as funny as his grand scheme of exhibiting
in the court-room before a witness as he takes the oath a
picture of the death of Ananias and Sapphira, in order to
remind him of the danger of perjury. 1 2
As contrasted with Bentham's practical suggestions fdr
real legal reform, these fruits of his. reflection remind one of
the Prophet Jeremiah's figs: those which are good are very,
very good, and those that are naughty are evil, very evil,
that cannot be eaten, they are so evil
Before concluding it may not be without interest to notice some traces of the two-witness rule in the Statute Law
of Pennsylvania.
The Great Law, or Body of Laws of Pennsylvania, passed
'1Rationale of Judicial Evidence, i, So.
Bentham, Judicial Evidence, i, 4o0.

Bentham's suggestion, that

the attention of the witness be also specially called to the law on the
subject of perjury, was anticipated by the Talmud. according to Mendelsohn's Criminal jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews, 5 7&

50
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at Upland, December io,1682 (0. S.),163 provided generally "that there shall be two credible witnesses in all cases
in order to judgment."
The Act of November 27, i7oo, c. xlii, required two

credible witnesses in all criminal cases, in order to judg16
ment. '
The Act of November 27,

17oo,

c. xlvii, required two

credible witnesses to convict of plotting against the proprietary or governor.1 6 '
And a glance over that pithy little manual called Purdon's Digest will show numerous statutes wherein the Legislature has thought fit to require two witnesses; and, in many,
the necessity exists at the present time. In most cases the
statute deals with what Bentham calls preappointed evidence.
Thus:
"All assignments made of bonds and specialties shall be
under hand and seal, before two credible witnesses." 166
To entitle a deed to be recorded it must be proved by two
7
witnesses.16
A judgment bond or note, or bond and mortgage, endorsed
as satisfied, and discharged in the presence of two witnesses,
is a warrant for its satisfaction of record by the prothonotary
or recorder. 1e
Judgment by confession, according to an early statute,
might be entered in an amicable action executed in the
presence of two or more witnesses. 16 '
A release of a legacy should be executed before at least two
competent subscribing witnesses in order to be recorded. 170
The petition of a married woman to be decreed a feme
sole trader must be sustained by the testimony of at least two
respectable witnesses 17 1
iCh. xxxvi, Duke of Yorke's Book of Laws, ix&

M2 Stat. at Large, 47.
t705-'6.

Repealed by Queen in Council, February 7,
in2 Stat. at Large, .5.

1,Act of May 28, 1715, § 8, 1 Smith go, Br. Purd, 224.
'"Act May 28, 715, § 2,
Smith 94, Br. Purd. 632; Act May 2S,
,,878 § , P. L. r5, Br. Purd. 6,1,.
Act April xx, x8"6, §z, P. L 304, Br. Purd. !Xo4.
Act March 25, rXo6, § 8, 4 Smith 330, Br. Purd. 62.
"'Act April is, x828, § i, io Smith 249, Br. Purd. 643."
"'Act May 4, z85s, § 4, P. L 4o, Br. Purd. 904.
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569

The statutory provision requiring two witnesses (generally subscribing) to a will is probably the best known example of preappointed testimony of this nature, introduced
172
by the Statute of Frauds, and generally followed.
This provision for attesting witnesses has never been
adopted in Icnnsylvania except in the cases of married
women's wills 1I4 and legacies or devises for charitable or
1
religious uses. 7
But two witnesses have always been required to prove
wills, either oral or written; 175 and, in the unusual case of a
uncupative will, there must be a distinct rogatio testium
duorun at the time of pronouncing the bequest.1 78
The deductions which may be drawn from what has been
said and submitted for consideration are these:
The two-witness rule originated in the canon law, in all
probability under the influence of the Mosaic law. It was
adopted by the civil law, and under the joint authority of the
civil and canon laws, by the Court of Chancery at a tinie
when the common law excluded the testimony of parties, and
was powerless to compel discovery by cross-examination of
an adverse party.
The substitution of corroborating circumstances for the
second witness was a later modification, and a still later
theory considered the responsive answer as technical evidence
for the defendant.
It remains to consider whether, as a matter of policy, the
rule should be longer continued. The objections to it would
seem to be at least three in number:
First.-It is said that the sworn answer of the defendant having been called forth by the plaintiff, the latter thereby
admits the answer to be evidence. This is not a fair statement of the plaintiff's position. He is obliged to call for an
answer if he brings his bill at all. Practically he has no
option, if he desires equitable relief. While he may waive
nBentam's remarks on this subject are more practical than usual,
vol. 2, p. 536.
"TUnder the Act of 1848, subsequently altered.
Act April 26, 1855, § ii, P. L 332.
Act Nov. 27, 1700, 2 Stat. at Large, 48, 49; Act Jan. 12, 7o5-6,
2 Stat. at Large, 195: Act April 8, 1833, § 6, P. L 249.
. inAct April 8, 1833, §7, P. L 249.
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an answer under oath, yet, unless the waiver be accepted by
the defendant, the latter cannot be deprived of his right to
file the answer under oath with all its responsive effect. 171
Second.-It is said that, if the answer is testimony, it is
equal to the testimony of any other witness. 178 But this assumes that any one witness is as good as any other witness,
and, if this principle were logically acted upon, the party producing the greater number of witnesses should prevail,
whereas witnesses should be weighed, not counted. Laid
down in this way, the rule frequently enables the chancellor
to settle, or rather avoid, a disputed question of fact by the
application of a rigid formula, and thus evade an awkward
responsibility, a consideration which doubtless has had a
grent though :;ilhnt influence in perpetuating the rule.
Third.-W'en the rule was established by the Court of
Chancery, the plaintiff at law had no right to call his adversary for cross-examination, so, when the chancellor compelled the defendant to answer the bill and interrogatories
under oath, it did not seem unfair to equalize the rights of
the parties by requiring a greater measure of countervailing
proof. But now that the old legal rules of exclusion of parties and interested witnesses have been swept away, this
justification of the equitable rule has disappeared. Parties,
both at law and in equity, may now call one another for
cross-examination, and may each testify in his own behalf.
And under the equity rule of 1894 the testimony may be
taken viva voce before the chancellor, who has thus a better
opportunity of determining the truth. 179
The plaintiff's statement at law (except in trespass) calls
for an affidavit of defence under oath. Why should a defence, if made by answer in equity, have any greater weight
thait the affidavit of defence at law? If the plaintiff at law
moves for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of
defence, he is doing exactly what the plaintiff has done in
equity for centuries, in putting the case down for hearing on
bill and answer. But, if the case goes to trial, let the answer
I Story, Equity Pleading, § 874.
' Clark v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Crancn, 153.
' Peacock v. Chambers, 3 Grant, 402.
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have no greater weight by reason of an artificial rule.

In

truth, as the law now stands, there exists a most important
distintnion between law and equity in regard to a matter as
to which there should be no difference at all.180
In making this general criticism, there should be allowed
at least one exception grounded upon public policy where a
party to a written contract endeavors -to reform it either at
law or in equity by parol evidence of fraud or mistake. In
such cases the writing itself is evidence of so high a character that he who signed it should not be allowed to repudiate
his signature, unless his testimony is supported by corroborating evidence of another witness or circumstances equivalent thereto.
It is very remarkable that the rule has been followed for
8
over two centuries, by case after case,"'
with so little discussion or objection. Yet it has not altogether escaped criti,
cism; Lord Eldon, in the well-known case of Evans v.
Bicknell,1 82 used language worth quoting:
"It appears to me a very extraordinary state of the law,
that if the plaintiff in the case of Pasley v. Freemnan183 had
come into equity, insisting that the defendant should make
good the consequences of his representation, and the defendant positively denied that he had made that representation,
and only one witness was produced to prove it, the Court
of Equity would give the defendant so much protection that
they would refuse the relief; and yet, upon the very same
circumstances, the law would enable the plaintiff to recover.
Whether that is following equity, or not quite outstripping
equity, is not a question for discussion now: but it leads to
the absolute necessity of affording protection by a statute,
requiring that these undertakings shall be in writing."
Lord Eldon, it should be observed, was here criticising
the case of Palsey v. Freeman, not the doctrine of his own
court, and was discussing the argument of counsel to the
' See Hunt's Argument for the Bishop's Right, 1682, cited in Parke's
History of the Court of Chancery, 234.

' See collected cases, Roach v. Glo$, 6 Am. and Eng. Dec. in Eq. 6S.

'6 Ves. 186 (~ox) ; cf. Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. 39.

"3 T. R. 51; 2 Smith, L. C. 66.
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effect that a rule of property in equity ought to be adopted
in the courts of law.184
A few years later 185 Lord Eldon went further, and expressed his doubt " whether the principle is as just as that
of the legal rule, on account of the interests of the party to
be contrasted with the evidence of a person having no interest." 180

Ve need not go as far as one federal judge18 7 who calls
the Chancery rule " absurd," still less need we endorse Bentham's caustic criticism, "Two propositions are here assumel: All men are liars, and all judges fools," 188 though
his more sober objections deserve consideration, at least
since the law of competency has been changed,18 but it is
belicved that we can echo the opinion of Chief Justice
litddell before cited: " If it is oath against oath, at law the
jury must decide between them, and, for myself, I see no
good reason why, in equity, the chancellor should not do the
same thing." 190
In advocating the abolition of this rule in Pennsylvania
we are supported by many examples in other jurisdictions.
In England the rule has been abrogated by the reform of
Chancery practice.191
'The reporter adds this note: "This rule, considered simply as a
general rule of evidence, seems open to observation, first, as preferring
the evidence of a party; second, upon the obvious defect of written,
compared with oral, testimony. It is difficult to determine the balance
of inconvenience and danger, on the one hand, from permitting, in a
commercial country, the defendant to avail himself of his own oath to
a degree in some respects beyond the old wager of law, and, on the
other, from deciding upon the evidence of a single witness, in cases
even requiring the utmost accuracy and precision in the proof."
IMEast India Co. v. Donald, 9 Ves. 275 (i8o4).

'"Of

course, at that time the single witness contradicting the an-

swer must have been disinterested. In some of the very early cases a
curious inconsistency was noted, namely: that a co-plaintiff, though
but a trustee, cannot be examined as a witness for the other plaintiff:
Phillips v. Duke of Bucks, i Vern. 229 (1683), but might have been
made a defendant and required to answer. Colchester v. Anon., z
P. Wins. 596 (1719); Windham v. Richardson, 2 Ch. Cas. 214 (1675).
"'Wells, D. J.: Eads v. H. D. Bacon, i Newb. 274, Fed. Cases, 4232.
'"Judicial Evidence, iv, 503. Lord Thurlow said in Pember v.
Mothers, i Bro. C. C. 52 (779): "The original rule stands on great
authorities, so does the manner of liquidating it; I do not see great
'"Bentham, Judicial Evidenc., V, 496.
reason in either."
'"McCullough v. Barr,145 Pa. 459l Daniel, 5th Am. Ed. § 822; Williams v. Williams, io Jur. N. S.
608; cf. Holderness v. Rankin, 2 De G. F. and J. 258, 272. The general
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In many of the United States the rule has been abolished,
and in many others substantially modified, either by legislation or rules of court. In some the bill may be sworn to, in
which case the plaintiff's oath is held to balance that of the
respondent; in others the plaintiff may waive an answer
under oath, in which case the answer is regarded as merely
pleading. Such are the decisions in Alabama,1 92 California,193 Delaware,1 9 ' Georgia, 19 5 Illinois, 9 6 Indiana,1 ' T
Iowa,19 8 . Kentucky,199 Maine 2 00 Maryland,2 0 ' Massachusetts,20 2 Michigan, 20 Mississippi,20 4 Missouri,205 New
W20
Hampshire,20 6 New Jersey,2 07 New York, 20 8 Tennessee,
210
2
11
212
Vermont,
Virginia,
West Virginia,
and the United
21
States Courts. '
During the last session of the Pennsylvania Legislature
a bill was introduced to abolish the rule and assimilate the
principle of Scots law is, that the testimony of one witness, however
credible, is not full proof in either civil or criminal cases, but the rule
has been greatly modified by statute in particular cases, and is subject
to two important qualifications, that any single fact (or link, as it were,
in a case) may be proved by one witness, and corroborative facts or
circumstances may, in all cases, supply the place of the second witness:
Article
3 Scots L. T. 93.
t
"Zelnicker v. Brigham, 74 Ala. 598; Watts v. Eufaula Bank, 76
Ala.15474.
Goodwin v. Hammond, 13 Cal. z68; Bostic Y. Love, x6 Cal. 69.
"Cuinnsins v. Jermon, 6 Del. Ch. 12
Woodward
Gates, 3852Ga.
'Hopkins
v. v.Granger,
IlL205.
5o4, Tracy v. Rogers, 69 Ill. 662;
Boyd v. Brown, 74 Ill. App. 2o5; Pattersonv. Scott, x42 IlL z38.
tLarsh v. Brown, 3 Ind. 234; Moore v. McClintock, 6 Ind. 2o9;
Peck v. Hunter, 7 Ind. a9S.
'" Graves v. Alden, 13 Iowa, 573; Smith v. Phelps, 3a Iowa, 53w.
'"Worley v. Tuggle, 67 Ky. 168 "Clay v. Towle, 78 Me. 86.
Davis v. Crockett, 88 Md. 249.
Chancery Rules, 24 Pick, 411; Babcock v. Smith, 22 Pick. 6;
Bingham v. Yeomans, xo Cush. 58.
" Van Inwagen v. Van Inwagen, 86 Mich. 333.
"'Jacks v. Bridewell, 5 Miss. 88r; Walter v. Shannon, 53 Miss.
500; Holmes v. Lemon, iS Southern Rep. x4x.
Walton v. Walton, 17 Mo. 376.
' M Ayer v. Messer, 59 N. H. 279; Wilson v. Towle, 36 N. Z. x
Sweet v. Parker,22 N. J. Eq. 453; Neldon v. Roof, Ss N.. Eq.

6o&

Bartlett v. Gale, 4 Paige, 503; Stilewell v. Carpenter,62 N. Y. 639.
McLard v. Linnville, io Humph. i63; Lindsey v. James, 3 Coldw'.
477; Trabue v. Turner, 57 Tenn. 447.
Veile v. Blodgett, 49 Vt. 270.
Code Va. 1887, Clh. 159, § 2381.
Lowry v. Buftington, 6 W. Va. 249; Brown v. KnapP, 7 W. V2.
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proceedings in equity to an action at law. The bill, however,
too late to permit action to be taken
was introduced
2 14
upon it.

Should any further attempt be made to alter the practice
it would be well to provide that the bill, as well as the answer,
should be under oath; for while the proposed act deprives
the answer of any effect as evidence, it makes no change as
to the bill. Either the bill and answer should both be under
oath, or neither.
There appears to be no reason why the practice in equity
should not be governed by the same rules as obtain at law
as far as practicable, and both parties, plaintiff and defendant, be required to substantiate their averments by a
judicial oath, the violation of which will subject them to the
215
penalty for perjury.
Among the early precedents there is a case where the bill
was sworn to, but this was an isolated instance, and probably the oath was added in error or voluntarily, 16 but it has
several times been thought that the practice should be
changed so as to require the plaintiff to swear to his bill.
2 17
Lord Ellesmere is reported to have been of this.opinion
"It will be observed that the bill applies only to proceedings in
equity, and would not, therefore, affect equitable actions in common
law forms, to which reference has been made; nor would it perhaps
change the practice in the Orphans' Court, which, apparently without
question, has adopted the Chancery practice. Krogman's Est., 34 W.
N. C. 104; Priestley's App., 127 Pa. 42o; 0. C. Rules X, § 2.
Senate Bill No. 497.. "Be it enacted
'a' The bill was as follows:
by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted by
the authority of the same, That in all causes in equity now pending
or hereafter to be brought in any of the courts of this Commonwealth,
it shall not be necessary that the averments of a responsive answer
to the bill of complaint shall be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or by the testimony of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances, but that, in all such causes, the defendant or defendants shall be compelled to prove the averments of his, her or their
aniwcr to the bill of complaint by proper evidence before the court,
referee or jury before whom and by which the said cause shall be
heard and determined in the same manner as causes are heard and
determined at law; provided, however, That nothing in this act shall
apply to causes in equity now pending in which the testimony has
been fully closed."
M io Selden Society, Case 133, Pref. xxv.

='Norburie, Abuse--- and Remedies of Chancery, Hargrave's Tracts,

i, 441.
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and so have other early writers,218 and such an oath might
readily have been required in Chancery by analogy to the
21
oath of calumny of the canon law. '

Mere destruction is not reform. If the usages of bygone
days are merely harmless mementos of legal history, we need
not disturb them. It was with a feeling akin to sadness that
some of us witnessed the passing of our old friends "John
Doe and Richard Roe, pledges for the prosecution," from
the form of the Narr. And if any rule of law makes on the
whole for justice, let us adhere to it, no matter how it originated or developed. Our ends should be utilitarian, and our,
reform conservative. The progress of the law is seldom
logical-it moves along the line of least resistance. But,
when the vestigial appendix forms a source of danger in our
Corpus Juris, let us operate without compunction.
Our law, that codeless myriad of precedent, is derived
from old local usages, Teutonic, Anglo-Saxon, and Norman
customs, the civil and canon laws overlaid with a thousand
years of statutes and judicial decisions. Let us, whenever
possible, eschew that which is evil, and hold fast to that
which is good. Unlike most human inventions, legal procedure develops from the complex to the simple, and simplicity is perfection.
John Marshall Gest.
Amicus Reipublica, by John March, x6sx, quoted in Parkes, p.
xg6. He gives as the reason that it would lessen and abate vexatious
and impertinent suits.
'See this oath described in Ayliffe's Parergon Jur. Can. Ang. z37:
"Quod non calumniandi animo litem se movisse zed existimando
bonam causam habere," Inst. B. 4, Tit. 6, § z. "Illud juretur quod I
tibi justa videtur; .e si quaretur, verum non in~ietur; nil #romittetur, nec falsa probatio detur, ut ls fardetur dilatio nulla petelur.-

Clarke's Praxis, Tit. cli; Gibson's Codex, ioo; Lyndwood Const
Otho, 6o; Oughton Ordo. Judic., Tit. cx. Browne says, voL 1, p. 48S,
that he had never known this used in practice.

